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Migration carries with it many risks, from perilous journeys along risky
corridors to hostile environments in the new country. But what happens when
migrants cannot return home? This contribution examines the difficulties
endured by Sakhalin Koreans, a group of ethnic Koreans who emigrated to
Sakhalin Island during the Japanese colonial period and found themselves
stranded in a foreign country for the next half century, in order to reveal the
infirmities of the international human rights system and the challenges of
repatriating a group of people when multiple countries are involved.
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Discussions of Japan’s World War II responsibility have reached a fever
pitch in the past few years. Litigation, legislation, international agreements, and
social activism have exposed the systematic abuses that Japan perpetrated
against a range of victims during the war.1 In the main, comfort women, forced
laborers, and victims of medical experimentation have unsuccessfully sought
redress in courts across the Asia-Pacific. A string of recent South Korean
verdicts, however, has found in favor of plaintiffs, suggesting a more active role
for domestic courts in redressing transnational wrongs.2 These verdicts have
†
Professor of Law, Western New England University. I thank Dean Sudha Setty and the
School of Law for generous research support and the editors of the Yale Journal of International Law for
their probing critiques.
1.
See Timothy Webster, Discursive Justice, 58 VA. J. INT’L L. 161 (2018) (describing many
of the most important decisions on war reparations in Japan).
2.
See generally Timothy Webster, South Korea Shatters the Paradigm: Corporate Liability,
Historical Accountability, and the Second World War, 26 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 123 (2022)

44

YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ONLINE

[Vol. 47: 1

exacerbated tensions between Seoul and Tokyo, setting in motion a diplomatic
spat with repercussions for those states’ economies and alliances, and also for
regional security more broadly.3
At the same time, another wartime issue has been sputtering towards
resolution. In 2020, South Korea passed the Special Law to Support Sakhalin
Compatriots,4 the first legislation aimed specifically at addressing this lingering
issue.5 During Japan’s colonization of Korea (1910-1945), Japan transported
some 150,000 Koreans to Sakhalin Island, the southern half of which Japan
prized from Imperial Russia under the 1906 Portsmouth Treaty.6 Koreans started
to emigrate voluntarily to Sakhalin in the 1920s. During the war, Japan—using
increasing amounts of coercion—conscripted tens of thousands of Koreans to
work in mines, forests, ports, and construction sites in Sakhalin.7 Displaced
Koreans remained on the island for the next half century, abandoned by Japan,
marginalized by the Soviet Union, and ignored by South Korea. Sakhalin
Koreans lived, in effect, as personae nullius: people belonging to no one. This
Essay traces the legal, sociological, and political history of the Sakhalin Koreans.
The displacement of ethnic Koreans to Sakhalin is neither the gravest
human rights violation of the twentieth century, nor even of the Second World
War. It has, however, proven among the least tractable. Many Koreans returned
home only in the 1990s and 2000s. Even now, several issues await resolution.8
The repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans concludes an important chapter in the
complex histories of Japan’s post-colonial and postwar responsibilities. It also
highlights the precarity of immigrants and displaced persons under the current

(analyzing decisions from Korean courts, including the Supreme Court, holding Japanese corporations
legally liable for wartime forced labor).
3.
See Scott A. Snyder, Why the Japan-South Korea Dispute Just Got Worse, CFR IN BRIEF
(Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/why-japan-south-korea-dispute-just-got-worse (“the JapanSouth Korea relationship has entered a dangerous new stage” following disagreements over a 2015
agreement and 2018 verdicts by the Supreme Court of South Korea).
4.
Sahallin Dongpo Jiweon-e Gwanhan Teuk-byeolboeb [Special Law to Support Sakhalin
Koreans], Law no. 17305 of 2020 [hereinafter Special Law].
5.
See Anton Troianovski, What’s in a Name? For the Koreans of Sakhalin, an Anguished
History, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/07/world/europe/korea-sakhalinjapan-russia.html.
6.
Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan-Russ., Sept. 5, 1905, 199 Consol. T.S. 144. According to
Article 9, “The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity
and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Saghalin [sic]” below the fiftieth degree of north
latitude.
7.
Many Koreans were mobilized to perform forced labor in Japan, as well as other parts of
Southeast and East Asia. An unknown number of Korean women (the so-called “comfort women”) were
also forced into sexual slavery at the hands of the Japanese military. See Timothy Webster,
Disaggregating Corporate Liability, 56 STANFORD J. INT’L L 175, 183 (2020).
8.
The 2020 law provides, inter alia, that the South Korean government shall provide support
for the return and resettlement of Sakhalin Koreans, make efforts to recover and repatriate the remains of
deceased Sakhalin Koreans, and promote commemoration projects to restore the honor of Sakhalin
Koreans. See Special Law, supra note 4, at art. 3. Unfortunately, only the spouse and “one lineal
descendant” can accompany a first-generation Sakhalin Korean back to South Korea. Special Law, supra
note 4, at 2(2). This means that siblings must fight over who that descendant will be. See Troianovski,
supra note 5. See also Kim Tong-Hyung, 70 Years Later, Families of Koreans Forced Into Labor Are
Desperate For Answers, THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 12, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/70-yearslater-families-of-koreans-forced-into-labor-are-desperate-for-answers/ (describing the difficulties of
repatriating remains of deceased Sakhalin Koreans for proper burial in South Korea).
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international human rights system. Sakhalin Koreans, as well as their supporters
in Japan and South Korea, resorted to various tactics to demand repatriation from
the Soviet Union. But as this Essay makes clear, two of the primary channels
through which Sakhalin Koreans aimed to resolve their dispute suffered serious
flaws. First, domestic litigation in Japan proved unavailing, as the Japanese
government lacked the political will and diplomatic initiative to achieve the
repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans. Second, appeals to international institutions,
namely the United Nations, also failed, largely due to the imperviousness of
superpowers such as the Soviet Union. Decade after decade, Sakhalin Koreans’
pleas fell on deaf ears. Only with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and end (or
perhaps abeyance) of the Cold War were Sakhalin Koreans allowed to return
after a half century of exile.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
The following section briefly describes the saga of the Sakhalin Korea’s
voyage home. After World War II, Japan organized a multinational effort to
repatriate roughly six million soldiers, colonial settlers, and others spread
throughout East and Southeast Asia,9 including hundreds of thousands of people
sent to Sakhalin during Japan’s period of occupancy. However, on August 23,
1945, after resuming sovereignty over Northern and Southern Sakhalin, the
Soviet Union imposed a departure ban on “foreign residents” (i.e., Korean and
Japanese still residing on Sakhalin).10 In 1946, the United States and Soviet
Union concluded an agreement to repatriate certain non-Russian residents of
Sakhalin.11 But only ethnically Japanese residents were allowed to return; some
43,000 ethnic Koreans remained on Sakhalin.12
Under Japanese law, both ethnic Korean and Japanese retained Japanese
nationality during the immediate postwar period. But Japan denationalized
Taiwanese and Korean residents in the early 1950s.13 Thus, when the Japanese
Empire fell, ethnicity—not nationality—proved the decisive factor in
determining who returned home, and who did not.14 This reveals the slippery
nature of colonial legality; Japan promised equality to ethnic Koreans during the
colonial period, but abandoned such pretensions after the war.
By 1949, with most ethnic Japanese evacuated from Sakhalin, Sakhalin
Koreans found themselves alone on the margins of another empire, the Soviet
9.
Mark Caprio & Mizuno Naoki, Stories from Beyond the Grave: Investigating Japanese
Burial Grounds in North Korea, ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL | JAPAN FOCUS (Mar. 2, 2014),
https://apjjf.org/2014/12/9/Mizuno-Naoki/4084/article.html.
10. Yi Shin Cheol [이신철], Sakhalin Koreans: Victims of Colonization and the Cold War
[사할린 한인,식민 과 냉전의 희생자], in Seminar on Sakhalin Koreans [사할린 한인 관련 세미나] 4,
12, National Archives of Korea [국가기록원] (2012), https://museum.seoul.go.kr/common/file/NR_
download.do?id=18388.
11. 髙木健一 [Takagi Ken’ichi], サハリンと日本の戦後責任 [SAKHALIN & JAPAN’S
POSTWAR RESPONSIBILITY] 58 (1991).
12. See Choung Il Chee, Repatriation of Stateless Koreans from Sakhalin Island: Legal Aspect
[sic], 17 KOR. J. COMPAR. L. 1, 2 (1989).
13
See Timothy Webster, Legal Excisions, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 433, 447-448 (2006).
14. Id. at 12-14 (noting that Japan did not denationalize its Korean population until 1952 and
that South Korea did not establish its citizenship regime until 1948).
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Union.15 Life under the Soviet regime was not easy, but one group had a
particularly rough time. The Soviet Union provided three choices of nationality
for Sakhalin Koreans: Soviet, North Korean, or stateless. About sixty-five
percent of Sakhalin Koreans elected North Korea, while twenty-five percent
opted for Soviet citizenship. Both choices ensured preferential treatment in
education, housing, employment, and other social services.16 But the remaining
ten percent—perhaps 7,000 people—chose statelessness, because it seemed the
most viable route back to South Korea.17 The third option clearly represented a
gamble for Sakhalin Koreans; the distant prospect of future repatriation was
exchanged for forsaking the material, social, and legal comforts they would have
enjoyed in the present. Stateless Sakhalin Koreans could not receive passports,
one of many obstacles they had to surmount in returning home.18
When Japan and the Soviet Union reestablished diplomatic relations in
1956, another group of Sakhalin residents returned to Japan, primarily ethnically
Japanese women (mostly wives of Korean men) and their family members of
Korean descent.19 Soviet authorities in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the island’s largest
city, further inflated expectations by posting a sign, in Korean, that promised exit
visas to stateless people.20 Hundreds applied, a number that apparently surprised
Soviet immigration authorities; Soviet authorities balked, took down the sign,
and refused to issue a single visa.21
One Sakhalin Korean thus “liberated” was Pak Nohak, who had married a
Japanese woman during the colonial period. On the boat back to Japan, Pak wrote
a petition to then-South Korean President Syngman Rhee demanding the
repatriation of his fellow Koreans.22 Pak also spoke to fellow returnees about
how to repatriate their compatriots. Upon arriving in Japan, Pak and others
formed the Association of Resident Koreans Repatriated from Sakhalin, which
played a leading role in the repatriation movement.23 The Association has,
among other things, facilitated correspondence between Sakhalin Koreans and
their families in South Korea and Japan, compiled lists of persons seeking

15. Technically speaking, the Russian empire ended with the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. See
SAMIR PURI, THE SHADOWS OF EMPIRE: HOW IMPERIAL HISTORY SHAPES OUR WORLD (2021). Yet as
Puri persuasively argues, “the end of imperial Russia was not the end of Russia’s imperial story.” Id. at
137. Rather, “the USSR was an empire that had subjugated a variety of surrounding territories.”
16. JOHN J. STEPHAN, SAKHALIN: A HISTORY 163, 194 (1971).
17. Id. at 194. The population of Sakhalin Koreans grew from 43,000 in 1945 to approximately
70,000 by the late 1960s, as many bore children in the intermediary decades.
18. Andrei Lankov, Forgotten People: The Koreans of the Sakhalin Island in 1945-1991,
NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY WATCH (2010), https://www.nkeconwatch.com/nk-uploads/LankovSakhalin-2010.pdf.
19. See 半谷史郎 [Hanya Shirô], サハリン朝鮮人のソ連社会統合：モスクワ党文書が語
る1950年代半ばの一段面 [The Soviet Social Integration of Sakhalin Koreans—A Cross Section of What
Moscow Party Documents Say in the Mid-1950s], スラブ、ユーラシア学の構築研究補報告集
[Research Reports on the Construction of Slavic and Eurasian Studies] (Dec. 2004), 69, 72, https://srch.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no5/hanya.pdf.
20. ÔNUMA YASUAKI, SAHARIN KIMIN: SENGO SEKININ NO TENKEI [SAKHALIN’S ABANDONED
PEOPLE: SCENES OF POSTWAR RESPONSIBILITY] 44-45 (1992).
21. Id. at 45.
22. See TAKAGI, supra note 11, at 60.
23. In Japanese, the group is known as 樺太帰還在日韓国人会.
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repatriation, and promoted family reunions.24 The Association also petitioned
national governments and international organizations to seek assistance in the
repatriation efforts.25
In the early 1960s, as Japan and South Korea negotiated the
reestablishment of diplomatic relations (and ultimately, the terms of what
became the Basic Treaty),26 Association members pressured Tokyo and Seoul to
repatriate the remaining Sakhalin Koreans.27 But the South Korean government
reportedly did not raise the issue during negotiations with Japan; after signing
the Basic Treaty, South Korea acquiesced on the issue for decades.28
In the 1970s, the Association compiled a list of approximately 7,000
Koreans who wished to return to South Korea. In September 1971, family
members of Sakhalin Koreans formed a pressure group in Taegu, South Korea.29
The Taegu group coordinated with Pak’s group in Tokyo to facilitate
communication and correspondence between Koreans stranded on Sakhalin and
their family members in South Korea. Since South Korea and the Soviet Union
did not recognize each other, direct contact was virtually impossible between
Sakhalin Koreans and their families in South Korea; all communications had to
pass through Japan.
In 1975, the cause of repatriation received another jolt of activism,
diplomatic attention, and media coverage with the filing of two lawsuits, detailed
below. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the lawsuits nonetheless raised
awareness of the Sakhalin Koreans’ plight, prodded state action, and mobilized
supporters on both sides of the Tsushima Strait.30
In 1983, the Japan Civil Liberties Union (JCLU), a leading human rights
organization, joined the struggle. The JCLU collaborated with the International
League of Human Rights to petition the United Nations Human Rights
Commission.31 The petition noted the human rights elements of the Sakhalin
Korean issue: specifically, Sakhalin Koreans could not exercise the right to leave
a country, or enter another, in direct contravention of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).32 It further demanded that the Japanese

24. See TAKAGI, supra note 11, at 60.
25. Id.
26. After World War II, Japan and South Korea severed diplomatic relations, but the two states
reestablished them through the Basic Treaty of 1965. See Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and
the Republic of Korea, Japan-S. Kor., June 22, 1965, 583 U.N.T.S. 33.
27. See TAKAGI, supra note 11, at 63.
28. 이신철 [Yi Shin-Cheol], 사할린 한인, 식민과 냉전의 희생자 [Sakhalin Koreans, Victims
of Colonization and the Cold War], in 동토에서 찾은 통한의 기록: 사할린 한인 관련 세미나
[RECORDS OF A PASSAGE FOUND IN FROZEN GROUND: SEMINAR ABOUT SAKHALIN KOREANS] 4, 14
(National Archives of Korea, 2012) https://museum.seoul.go.kr/cgcm/board/NR_boardView.do?
bbsCd=1014&seq=00000000000001691&tr_code=m_sweb.
29. The group is known in English as the Association to Promote the Repatriation of Sakhalin
Detainees [화태억류귀환촉진회].
30. In Soo Son, Sakhalins in Korea, 9 INT’L J. WORLD PEACE 3 (1992). The author notes that
“The trial was instrumental in attracting public attention to the plight of Koreans in Sakhalin.” Id. at 10.
31. U.N. Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights Written Statement
Submitted by the International League of Human Rights, U.N. Doc/E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/NGO/9 (Aug. 29,
1983).
32. Id.
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government reinstate the Japanese citizenship of Sakhalin Koreans, repatriate
them to Japan, and issue them Japanese passports.33 The petition called on Tokyo
and Moscow to permit visits by Sakhalin Koreans to their families in Japan or
South Korea. Unfortunately, these efforts, without a campaign of sustained
pressure on the United Nations, made little progress towards ultimately resolving
the issue.
Only with the dissolution of the Soviet Union (1989-92) did Sakhalin
Koreans take meaningful steps towards resettlement in South Korea. The first
temporary visits took place in April 1989. With the assistance of the Japanese
and South Korean Red Cross organizations, over four thousand first-generation
Sakhalin Koreans permanently resettled in South Korea between 1992 and
2012.34 Nonetheless, as a condition of resettlement, this older generation of
Koreans had to leave behind their kin in Sakhalin.35 After a half century, the joy
of reuniting with family members in South Korea commingled with the pain of
leaving children and grandchildren in Sakhalin. Indeed, some repatriated
Koreans ultimately went back to Sakhalin to live with their lineal descendants.36
II. LITIGATION
With the saga of Sakhalin Koreans now charted, we turn to the role of law,
and litigation in particular, in resolving this long-festering war reparations issue.
The turn to litigation in the mid-1970s marked the convergence of two trends.
First, civil society groups dedicated to war reparations had formed throughout
East Asia.37 These groups focused primarily on domestic mobilization—
attracting members, raising capital, strategizing, and increasing awareness. Over
time, they forged transnational linkages with Japanese activists, cause lawyers,
and civil society groups to seek a wide range of compensation from corporations
and state actors.
Second, Japanese attorneys had turned to litigation to address social
problems, such as environmental pollution and employment discrimination.38

33. Id.
34. 배덕호 [Pae Deok-ho], ‘해방되지 못한’ 사할린 한인의 역사적 현실과 실천과제 [The
Historical Reality and Practical Tasks of ‘Unliberated’ Sakhalin Koreans’], 6 역사와 책임 [HISTORY &
RESPONSIBILITY] 12, 24 (2013), http://forumtj.org/index.php?mid=pub&document_srl=303&ckattempt
=1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Timothy Webster, The Taiwanese Roots of East Asia’s War Reparations
Movement, 70 AM. J. COMP. L. __ (forthcoming 2022) (noting the formation if civil society groups
dedicated to Taiwanese war reparations in Tokyo and Taipei in 1975); Matt VanVolkenburg, Trial of
Korean Atomic Bomb Survivors, KOREA TIMES (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/
nation/2019/08/177_273470.html (noting the 1967 formation of the Korean Atomic Bomb Victims Relief
Association); Barbara Basler, And Speaking of the World’s Wistful Causes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 1990),
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/19/world/hong-kong-journal-and-speaking-of-the-world-s-wistfulcauses.html (noting the 1968 formation of the Hong Kong Reparations Association).
38. See, e.g., Robert L. Kidder & Setsuo Miyazawa, Long-Term Strategies in Japanese
Environmental Litigation, 16 L. & SOC. INQ’Y 605, 624 (1993) (recognizing that litigation in Japan “has
become part of a strategy for organizing and expressing opposition to the dominant political and economic
tendencies”); Frank Upham, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN JAPAN 58 (1987) (noting the role of Japanese
courts in resolving major pollution incidents).
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Japanese citizens had turned to Japanese courts to seek compensation for various
harms suffered during the war.39 But the war reparations movement became a
transnational phenomenon in 1972, when a Korean victim of the atomic
bombings sued the Japanese government to access medical benefits.40 Over the
next five decades, Japanese courts adjudicated scores of disputes about whether
and how Japan should compensate its former colonial subjects (citizens of
Taiwan and South Korea) and former enemies (citizens of China, Philippines,
United States, Netherlands, and other Allied nations).41 This section analyzes
two seminal cases filed in Japan—the first discussion in English of either suit.
However, due to space constraints, I omit discussion of three other cases brought
by Sakhalin Korean.42
A. Song Du-hoe v. Japan (filed January 16, 1974)43
Song has played a seminal role in Asia’s war reparations movement. By
the time he filed the first lawsuit concerning Sakhalin Koreans, he was a “repeat
player” in the Japanese legal system. Born in South Korea and raised in Kyoto
and colonial Manchuria, Song was convicted of violating Japan’s Foreign
Resident Registration Act in 1964 and sentenced to a month in prison.44 In 1969,
he unsuccessfully sued the government of Japan to reinstate the Japanese
nationality he had as a colonial subject.45 In 1973, he made his most prominent
39

See, e.g., Fujimoto Akiyama v. Japan, 22 MINSHÛ 12, p. 2808 (Sup. Ct. J., Nov. 27, 1968) (dismissing
case brought by two Japanese citizens to regain property seized by Canada after the Second World
War); Shimoda Ryûichi v. Japan, 355 HANREI JIHÔ 17 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 7, 1963), partially translated
in 8 JAPANESE ANN. INT’L L. 212 (1964) (dismissing claims brought by Japanese victims of the atomic
bombing against Japan under principles of sovereign immunity).
40. Son Jin-du v. Governor of Fukuoka, Fukuoka Chihô Saibansho (Fukuoka D. Ct.], Mar. 30,
1974) (ordering provincial government to issue plaintiff a health certificate to access medical benefits for
atomic-bomb survivors).
41. For a summary of Japan’s transnational war lawsuits, see Timothy Webster, Japan’s
Transnational War Reparations Litigation: An Empirical Analysis, 63 HARV. INT’L L.J. 571 (2022).
42. In 1990, Lee Doo-hoon and other plaintiffs sought reparations for “Japan’s illegal abduction
and forced labor, non-performance of the duty to repatriate, and active interference in the return process,
amounting to ‘crimes against humanity’ under customary international law.” Lee Doo-hoon v. Japan,
Tokyo Chihô Saibansho (Tokyo D. Ct., filed Aug. 21, 1990) (case later withdrawn when Japan allocated
funds to cover the repatriation of Sakhalin Koreans to South Korea and the construction of apartments
and a nursing home). The complaint for the case is available online at justice.skr.jp/petition/10.pdf. This
passage comes from page twenty-three of the complaint. In 1991, family members of Sakhalin Koreans
killed by Japanese police on suspicion of being spies during the end of World War II sued Japan for
compensation and apologies. In 2007, eleven Sakhalin Koreans sued Japan to demand the reimbursement
of postal savings accounts and insurance premiums that they took out in Sakhalin during the war. They
withdrew their claims when the Korean Constitutional Court indicated that the Korean government acted
unconstitutionally by “not making every effort to resolve” the comfort-women and atomic-bomb survivor
issues. Sakhalin Korean plaintiffs thought that their efforts better targeted at the South Korean
government. See 노영돈 [Loh Yeong Don, 사할린한인 우편저금청구소송과 그 후의 동향 [The
Reimbursement Claim for Postal Savings of Sakhalin Koreans Unpaid by Japan during the World War II
[sic]], 29 [SUNGKYUNKWAN LAW REVIEW] 32, 62 (2017).
43. Song Du-hoe 宋斗会 v. Japan, Tôkyô Chihô Saibansho (Tokyo District Court, filed Jan. 16,
1974), complaint available at justice.skr.jp/petition/3.pdf (hereinafter “Song complaint”).
44. See 李洙任 [Yi Su-Im], 日本の植民地支配に対する未来責任と特別永住者への処遇
[Future Responsibility for Japanese Colonial Rule and Treatment of Special Permanent Residents], 25 世
界人権問題研究センター研究紀要 [WORLD HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH INSTITUTE BULLETIN OF
RESEARCH] 77, 90 (2020), available at khrri.or.jp/publication/docs/202007025004%281519KB%29.pdf.
45. Id. Many other Korean and Taiwanese citizens sued Japan to reinstate their Japanese
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gesture of activism: burning his Alien Resident Certificate (ARC) in the lobby
of Japan’s Ministry of Justice (an act for which he was later criminally
prosecuted).46 At this time, Song met attorney Takagi Ken’ichi, a recent law
graduate of the University of Tokyo, who helped Song draft his complaint on
behalf of ethnic Koreans still residing in Sakhalin.47 For the next several decades,
activist Song and attorney Takagi played salient roles in litigating war
compensation cases.48
The complaint combined social history, political protest, and formal legal
request. In seeking the repatriation of some 8,491 Sakhalin Koreans, Song
demanded that Japan (1) investigate which Sakhalin Koreans wanted to return to
South Korea or Japan, (2) cover transportation costs, arrange necessary
procedures, and issue supporting documents, and (3) “compensate Korean
plaintiffs, who were forcibly mobilized during World War II, for the emotional
and physical damages they endured in twenty-nine years apart from their
families.”49
Song was perhaps the first activist to file a lawsuit in East Asia’s war
compensation movement, presaging contemporary developments in several
ways. First, Song’s complaint narrated the history of Japanese colonialism from
a Korean perspective, both complementing and complicating the dominant
Japanese view. Take the following passage:
In 1910, Japan annexed the Korean state through invasion, and then colonized it. The
Annexation Agreement abolished the Great Korean Empire, changed its name to
Choson, and established the Governor-General of Korea, subjecting Koreans to
immeasurably barbaric and inhumane abuses. This is an indisputable, historical fact.
The forced mobilization of Koreans, in particular, is Japan’s deepest stain during this
period of Japan-Korea relations.50

While obviously tendentious, this passage challenges conventional
Japanese history,51 advancing a Korean-centric view of colonial Japanese history
more akin to the narratives coming out of contemporary courts in Busan or Soule
than Tokyo or Osaka. The notion that Japan invaded Korea reflected the idea that
this was no benevolent annexation based on mutual interests, but rather imperial
nationality at this time.
46. See Takagi, supra note 11, at 53.
47. Id.
48. Though not a lawyer, Song assisted in such cases as the Ukishima-Maru (1992-2004), BClevel war criminals (1995-2001), and the Siberian Korean Returnees (1992-2002). Takagi litigated a
number of high-profile lawsuits, organized international symposia, and wrote several books about war
reparations litigation.
49. Song complaint, supra note 43, at 3.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. As might be expected, Japan and South Korea have very different perspectives on their
shared colonial history (1910-1945). For example, mainstream Japanese historians refer to the 1910 event
as a legal annexation. But South Koreans, including justices on the Supreme Court, believe that that
“Japan’s control over the Korean Peninsula during the Japanese occupation period was an unlawful
possession by force; and any legal interests resulting from such unlawful control... cannot be recognized
as effective.” See Park Chang-hwan v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, 2009 Da 22549, (Sup. Ct. S. Kor., May
24, 2012), translated by Seokwoo Lee, 2 KOREAN J. INT’L & COMP. L. 205, 214 (2014). As another
example, Japanese courts consider the conscription of Korean forced laborers pursuant to Japan’s 1938
National Mobilization Law to be legal, whereas Korean courts have deemed this action illegal forced
mobilization. See id. at 214.
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aggression.52 The name change recalls Japan’s colonial policy of forcing
Koreans to adopt Japanese names to access social benefits, part of a broader
strategy to extirpate Korean culture and to replace it with a Japanese core.53
Second, Song adopted a position vis-à-vis Japan more akin to today’s
plaintiffs than to litigants of the 1970s. In a word, Song sought reparations: a
form of redress for “gross violations of international human rights law or serious
violations of international humanitarian law.”54 This view resonates with the
contemporary (1990-present) reparations movement, in which comfort women
and forced laborers have demanded remediation for grave violations of
international law. In the 1970s, by contrast, Taiwanese plaintiffs sought
compensation from Japan,55 that is, provision “for any economically assessable
damage,” such as “social benefits” and “medicine and medical services,” already
available to Japanese citizens.56
Third, Song planted the seeds of legal theories that bore fruit decades later.
Many contemporary cases hinge on the coerciveness of Japan’s wartime labor
regime. In the above passage, Song referred to forced mobilization (kyôsei
renkô), implying Japan forcibly recruited labor from the Korean peninsula, and
rejecting the current formulation, popular in Japan, that the 1938 National
Mobilization Law legalized the conscription of Korean laborers. Like many
contemporary litigants, Song advanced the notion that Koreans went to Sakhalin
against their will, and thus illegally.
Elsewhere in the complaint, Song referred to “harsh physical labor,”
“forced labor,” and even “slave labor” that Koreans performed on behalf of
Japanese interests.57 This resonates in current debates about the nature of
wartime forced labor, which often highlights the abject labor conditions, lack of
food and clothing, verbal abuse, and physical assaults that Korean laborers
endured at the hands of Japanese corporate and state interests. But in the 1970s,
few were discussing Japan’s wartime use of “forced labor.”
Paradoxically, Song’s case was both too early and too late. It was too early
in the sense that the war reparations movement did not take off in earnest until
the 1990s and 2000s.58 But it was too late because, as the Tokyo District Court
found, Song already lived in Japan; his had accomplished his own repatriation,
52. The term “invasion” (shinryaku) resonates with the textbook controversy of 1982, when
Japanese textbooks sought to change the term “invade China” to “advance into China.” See EZRA F.
VOGEL, CHINA AND JAPAN: FACING HISTORY 351 (2019).
53. A short introduction to some of Japan’s more brutal exploits—prohibition of the Korean
language in educational systems, immolation of Korean historical documents, conversion of names into
Japanese, widespread use of forced labor, recruitment of comfort women—is available at Erin Blakemore,
How Japan Took Control of Korea, HISTORY (July 28, 2020), www.history.com/news/japan-colonizationkorea.
54. U.N. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation, UNGA Res.
60/147, Dec. 16, 2005, art. 15.
55. The relevant lawsuits include Son Jin-du v. Japan (Korean atomic bomb survivor sought
medical benefits from Japanese government), and Deng Sheng et al. v. Japan (Taiwanese veterans sought
pensions and solatia for harms suffered during World War II.
56. Basic Principles, supra note 54, at art. 20.
57. See Song v. Japan, supra note 43, complaint, p. 4 (including such terms as 苛酷な肉体労
働, 奴隷労働), p. 9 (強制労働).
58
See Webster, supra note 1, at 163-64 (describing the war reparations movement).
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and he could not sue on behalf of Koreans still stranded in Sakhalin. His suit did,
however, attract the attention of activists, domestic and international media, and
Japanese attorneys, including the aforementioned Takagi.
B. Lee Deok-rim v. Japan, filed December 1, 197559 (withdrawn June 15,
1989)
Lee’s lawsuit united activists from Japan, South Korea, and Sakhalin,
making it among the first truly transnational instances of war reparations
activism. In July 1975, nineteen Japanese attorneys, organized chiefly by Takagi,
formed a lawyers’ committee (bengodan) to investigate the Sakhalin Korean’s
legal claims.60 Working with Pak Nohak’s Association, the lawyers sent one
hundred questionnaires to Sakhalin Koreans who wished to repatriate.61 They
received sixty-four responses, from which they secured power of attorney from
four Koreans still residing in Sakhalin.62 In this way, the lawyers ensured that
they were prosecuting a live controversy in front of a Japanese court.
The lawsuit attracted media attention in Japan and South Korea the region,
keeping the issue alive among domestic audiences. Across sixty-four hearings in
the Tokyo District Court, litigants described decades of separation from family
and country. In 1981, one witness captured headlines after banging on the
witness table and demanding that Japan “give me back my brother.”63
In the end, Japanese courts wore down the plaintiffs. Three died during the
suit’s pendency. When the fourth, lead plaintiff Lee Deok-rim, resettled to South
Korea in April 1989, the case was withdrawn.
It would be easy to dismiss the lawsuit as a failure, for it led to repatriation
of only one of the four plaintiffs. But it also prodded Japan into action. In 1976,
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued hundreds of travel permits to
Sakhalin Koreans. Takagi suggested that the litigation instigated this response
from Japan.64 Moreover, the Minister of Justice responded to questions about
Sakhalin Koreans in the Japanese Diet, testifying that Japan retained “the moral
59. Plaintiffs included Lee Chi-myeong (이치명/李致明), Lee Deok-rim (이덕림/李徳林),
Cho Gyeong-gyu (趙敬奎/조경규) and Om Su-gap (厳寿甲/엄수갑). See Takagi, supra note 11, at 7677.
60. Id. at 76.
61. Id. at 71.
62. Id. at 72. See also 사할린 한국인교포귀환청구소송 준비 [Sakhalin Koreans Prepare
Lawsuit with Repatriation Claims], 중앙일보 [JOONGANG DAILY] (Aug. 19, 1975), www.joongang.co.kr/
article/1414752#home. See 데모하다 연행된 사할린 교포 [Sakhalin Koreans Detained During
Demonstration], 중앙일보 [JOONGANG DAILY] (Oct 20, 1976), www.joongang.co.kr/article/
1448865#home. This Essay reports that Sakhalin Koreans demonstrated outside City Hall in YuzhnoSakhalink in September 1976, shouting “Send me to Korea.” Soviet police reportedly arrested the
protestors, who then engaged in a hunger strike.
63. Japanese courtrooms are normally sedate., but filling the gallery with supporters has become
a key tactic of war reparations activists. The witness, Cho So-gyeong, was the sister of plaintiff Cho
Gyeong-gyu. See “일은 남편·동생 내놓아라” [“Japan, Give Me Back My Husband and My Brother”],
중앙일보 [JOONG ANG DAILY] (Nov. 28, 1981), https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/1606253#home.
64. See Takagi, supra note 11, at 158. However, in a repeat of the 1957 incident, Soviet
immigration authorities initially agreed to issue exit visas. When the North Korean Consul General
protested, the Soviets withdrew their offer. Japan-Soviet Union relations rapidly deteriorated thereafter,
when a Soviet air force pilot defected to Japan. This apparently ended the possibility of a comprehensive
solution between Japan and the Soviet Union.
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responsibility to return them to their original state in Japan.”65 At the same
hearing, Foreign Minister Miyazawa Kiichi66 stated that “strictly speaking,
putting aside the legal issue, we recognize that we cannot be indifferent to this
issue. In fact, we raise it each time we meet with the foreign ministry.”67
The lawsuit also called attention to the plight of Koreans stranded in
Sakhalin. Within Japan, the lawsuit is credited with illuminating an obscure
chapter of Japan’s wartime past and how this injustice continued to have effects
decades after the end of colonialism.68 Within South Korea, media coverage
informed Korean citizens about their compatriots, who otherwise had no direct
contact with people stranded in Sakhalin.
However, neither lawsuit substantively changed the position of Sakhalin
Koreans. Japan issued the necessary travel permits, signaling a previously
unseen willingness to address the issue. But the Soviet Union balked after a
Soviet Air Force pilot defected to Japan, heightening tensions between the two
countries and dimming prospects for cooperation on the Sakhalin issue.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS
The saga of the Sakhalin Koreans implicates a range of human rights, none
more acutely than the right to nationality and freedom of movement.
A. Nationality
The right to nationality, like the right to life, is both fundamental and
foundational: fundamental in the sense that numerous international treaties
recognize the right,69 and foundational in the sense that many rights depend upon
its guarantee. Just as one cannot enjoy human rights after forfeiting the right to
life, political rights (to vote, to hold office, etc.), freedom of movement, and
liberty interests are sacrificed when one lacks a nationality.70
Various legal instruments ensure nationality rights. The 1930 Nationality
65. See Record of 112th Diet, House of Rep., Cab. Comm. No. 5, Apr. 14, 1988, https://kokkai
.ndl.go.jp/simple/detail?minId=111204889X00519880414&spkNum=267#s267
(referencing 1976
remarks made by Justice Minister Inaba Osamu). In the war reparations context, state and private actors
alike frequently differentiate moral responsibility from legal liability. See generally Timothy Webster,
The Price of Settlement, 51 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 301, 326 (2019) (describing settlement agreements
wherein defendants accept or reject legal liability).
66. Miyazawa would later become Prime Minister of Japan, acknowledge the Japanese
government’s role in the “comfort women” system of sexual slavery, and issue the first apology from a
Japanese prime minister to South Korean comfort women in 1992.
67. Takagi, supra note 11, at 151.
68. See, e.g., 太田満 [Ota Mitsuru], サハリン残留、帰国者学習の教採材開発：国際理解
教育の視点から [Development of Teaching Materials about the Studies of Left Behind and Returnees
from Sakhalin: From the Perspective of International Education], 17共栄大学研究論集 [KYÔEI
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH REVIEW] 69, 73 (2018) (noting the lawsuit made the issue “widely known” in
Japan), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/228688999.pdf.
69. Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality: Report of
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/34, Dec. 14, 2009, para. 3 (locating the right in the UDHR,
ICCPR, CERD, CEDAW, CRC, etc.).
70. Human Rights Council, Human Rights and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality: Report of
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/43, Dec. 19, 2011 (listing a number of rights implicated by
the right to nationality).
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Convention empowered states parties to determine “who are its nationals,” and
“whether a person possesses the nationality . . . under its own law.”71 Japan was
a founding member of the League of Nations and drafted many of its
conventions. But Japan withdrew from the organization after the League
condemned Japan’s invasion of Manchuria. The Convention, which Japan
ratified, likely no longer bound Japan after 1935. The Soviet Union did not join
the League.
After World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
provided that “everyone has the right to a nationality”72 and that “no one shall
be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his
nationality.”73 The UDHR, as a mere declaration, is not legally binding; it places
no direct obligations on any state. Still, scholars suggest much of the Declaration
has crystallized into customary international law.74
The “implementing legislation” for the UDHR—the ICCPR and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—
guarantees children the right to citizenship, but not all people. This is an
important omission, born of a political stalemate where states could not agree on
which nation bore the duty to grant nationality when another nation voided it.75
In this way, delegates removed adult nationality from the ICCPR, and thus from
international human right law.
Of course, nationality is a politically fraught issue, impinging on state
sovereignty, political power, and ethno-national identity. International law
cannot simply tell states to grant nationality to a particular person. Nevertheless,
it is certainly true that nationality laws “marginalize and disenfranchise
vulnerable groups such as racial and ethnic minorities and women.”76
International treaties do, however, regulate nationality in at least two
ways.77 First, some treaties forbid racial discrimination in ways that possibly
concern nationality. The CERD Committee has reinforced this notion by calling
“deprivation of citizenship on the basis of race, color, descent or national or
ethnic origin . . . a breach of States Parties’ obligations.”78
Second, international law discourages states from withdrawing citizenship
and rendering people stateless. The 1954 Stateless Persons Convention and the
1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness reinforce the right to
71

League of Nations, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law, Apr.
13, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89.
72. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III),
art. 15 (1) (Dec. 10, 1948).
73. Id. at art. 15(2).
74. Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 287, 289 (1995).
75. Johannes Chan, The Right to Nationality in International Human Rights Law, 12 HUM. RTS.
L.J. 1, 4 (1992).
76. See Open Society Justice Initiative, Human Rights and Legal Identity: Approaches to
Combatting Statelessness and Arbitrary Deprivation of Nationality 3 (May 2006), aprrn.info/1/
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/5/identity_ 20060501.pdf.
77. Id. at 5-8.
78. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. XXX
on Discrimination against Non-Citizens, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3, para. 4 (2004).
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nationality. The latter provides, in the pertinent part, that a state “shall not
deprive a person of its nationality if such deprivation would render him
stateless.”79 Of course, neither the Soviet Union nor Japan signed or ratified
either convention. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union violated the spirit of
international law by failing to allow Sakhalin Koreans to take on South Korean
citizenship,80 and impeding their return to South Korea.
B. Freedom of Movement
The ICCPR guarantees freedom of movement, including the right to “leave
any country, including [the actor’s] own” (departure right),81 and the “right to
enter his own country” (entrance right).82 Like all rights, the freedom of
movement is not absolute. It can be restricted when “provided by law, [and]
necessary to protect, national security, public order (ordre public), public health
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.”83
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has clarified the elements of both
departure and entrance rights in case law and general comments. For departure,
human rights law imposes obligations on the state of residence and the state of
nationality, including the issuance of travel documents (exit visas) and
passports.84 The HRC has listed an array of common impediments, many of
which the Soviet Union erected to prevent repatriating Sakhalin Koreans,
including inter alia lack of access to information regarding requirements, special
forms to apply for passport and other travel documents, and unreasonable delays
in issuing necessary documentation.85
The HRC further noted that the right should not be restricted by
discrimination based on “sex, language... political or other opinion, national or
social origin... or other status.”86 By privileging ethnic Japanese, and Korean
husbands of Japanese women over other ethnic Koreans, the repatriation process
violated this aspect of the ICCPR.
The ICCPR also guarantees people the right to enter “their own country.”
The HRC has defined the phrase “their own country” expansively, including
people whose nationality had been stripped “in violation of international law”
and “individuals whose country of nationality has been incorporated into or
transferred to another national entity whose nationality is being denied them.”87
To which country did Sakhalin Koreans belong? They entered Sakhalin as
Japanese subjects, but Japan denationalized them after the war. The Soviet Union
79. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness art. 8, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175..
80. To be sure, the fact that the Soviet Union did not recognize South Korea, and vice versa,
made such a choice extremely unlikely, particularly during the frostiest moments of the Cold War.
81. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 12(2), Dec. 6, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 1711.
82. Id. at art. 12(4).
83. Id. at art. 12(3).
84. General Comment No. 27, Freedom of Movement (article 12), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, Nov. 1, 1999, para. 9.
85. Id., at para. 17.
86. Id. at para. 18.
87. Id. at para. 20.
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later permitted Sakhalin Koreans to take on Soviet or North Korean citizenship,
which most of them did. But the roughly seven thousand Sakhalin Koreans who
elected “statelessness” held only attenuated claims to South Korean citizenship:
South Korea did not exist when they were transported to Sakhalin, and they never
“lived” in South Korea. What is more, when South Korea finally emerged in
1948, it did not recognize the Soviet Union. In a sense, stateless South Koreans
were beyond the scope of international law.
The Soviet Union prevented the emigration of many ethnic minorities from
within its borders.88 Having lost some twenty million people in World War II,
the state needed labor, particularly in underdeveloped regions such as Sakhalin.
Decades later, a mass exodus revealed that the Soviet Union was not the
“workers’ paradise” proclaimed in state media. In the 1970s, under pressure from
Western governments, the Soviet Union permitted approximately 300,000 Soviet
(mostly Jewish) citizens to emigrate to Israel, Germany, Canada and the United
States.89 But without strong states advocating on behalf of Sakhalin Koreans, it
took the dissolution of the Soviet Union to loosen its grip on Sakhalin Koreans.
IV. CONCLUSION
Sakhalin Koreans lived in exile, a racial minority in an authoritarian
regime, for more than a half-century. Their desertion on a remote island reflects
the convergence of several factors: Japan’s abandonment of colonialism and
formerly colonial subjects, the fraught tensions of the Cold War, South Korea’s
tenuous relationship to problems that arose during Japanese colonialism, and the
Soviet Union’s status as both superpower and permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council. Any one of these factors might have inhibited repatriation. But
their amalgamation rendered the issue irresolvable for half a century.
Efforts to organize in South Korea, Japan, and Sakhalin created solidarity
among these forsaken people and publicized their plight. While appeals to
domestic courts and international institutions have altered Japan’s behavior in
certain contexts, Japan was not the sole party involved. In the end, a combination
of Japanese reluctance, Soviet imperiousness, and South Korean apathy doomed
the Sakhalin Koreans.
Their saga illustrates the precarity of the international human rights system
and the comparative powerlessness of individuals to challenge the authority of
powerful states. Social activism, domestic litigation, and appeals to international
institutions have been powerful catalysts in various human rights endeavors,
from ending apartheid to restitution for the Holocaust. But it is also important to
review cases where those same techniques and responses proved ineffective.
Such investigations illumine both the advantages and drawbacks of these
mechanisms to yield social, political, and legal change.

88. See George Perkovich, Soviet Jewry and American Foreign Policy, 5 WORLD POL’Y J. 435
(1988) (describing U.S. pressure, as well as activism by Soviet Jews, to permit emigration); Zvi Gitelman,
Exiting from the Soviet Union: Emigrés or Refugees, 3 MICH. J. INT’L L. 43 (1982) (providing figures on
the numbers and ethnicities of Soviet emigrés).
89. Gitelman, supra note 88, at 44.

